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The UK exercises in research quality assessment since 1986 have had ill-defined objectives. 
For the first exercises the results were simply ‘to inform funding’, seeking value for money in 
an evaluative, regulatory state. That aim remained, almost word for word, until the 
Research Assessment Framework (REF) in 2014, when there was an additional articulated 
intent ‘to change behaviour’. There had already been much changed behaviour over the 
years, perhaps unintended, apparently unexpected, as staff adapted their responses to 
changing ‘rules of the game’ and the meaning they attributed to these. This article outlines 
the changing mechanics of successive exercises – the process means to ill-defined policy 
ends, and analyses the impact of design features which have affected the staff, and 
distorted institutional strategies of both policy development and control of delivery. The 
cumulative effect is to imbalance the system to favour a small elite, leading to isomorphism 
and funding concentrated to an extent that risks loss of diversity and stifling of challenges to 
established ideas, failing to recognise a variety of excellences. 
Key words: performance management, diversity, ends and means, design defects, 
unexpected consequences. 
  
   3 
 
Imbalancing the academy: the impact of research quality assessment 
 
Introduction 
It is thirty years since the first national approach to assessing research quality in a university 
system was introduced. The pioneer was the United Kingdom, in 1986, within a context 
where the Thatcher government had an agenda of ‘value for money’ in public services, of 
containing the autonomy claimed by professionals, and increasing the accountability for the 
use of public funds. That applied not only to university academics and their institutions, but 
to school teachers, medics and others in the public sector, as elements of both the 
evaluative state (Neave, 1998) and the regulatory state (King, 2007) developed. At that time, 
the University Grants Committee, the buffer body between the then universities and the 
state, assumed that academics spent one third of their time doing research, and funded 
them accordingly. The first exercises served to audit that belief with the aim of ‘informing 
funding decisions’. The belief was misplaced.  Successive exercises took place in 1989, 1992, 
1996, 2001, 2008 and 2014. Geuna and Piolatto (2016) claim that the Italian system for 
research quality assessment, VQR, operated through ANVUR (Agenzia Nazionale di 
Valutazione dell’Universita e della Ricerca), was inspired by the UK scheme where the 
‘experience, errors and improvements since 1986 have been used to inform policies [and] 
initiatives in other European and world countries’ (p263), but warn about cultural impacts 
on policy transfer and the time needed to gain experience and develop appropriate skills. 
The aim of this article is to review some of those errors and experiences. It examines shifts 
in the UK exercises and the way individuals and institutions responded. In doing so, it 
records the lack of clear stated ends beyond the economic – value for money - and the 
constant changes to criteria, data requirements and processes of evaluation – the means to 
the ends. This is similar to, though not totally congruent with the distinction made by Glaser 
in his contribution to this issue, ‘between strategic autonomy (the autonomy of selecting 
goals) and operational autonomy (the autonomy to select approaches to goal attainment)’. 
There is evidence that the research assessment approach displaced more appropriate goals 
that universities might have set for the quality of their activity and even distorted the 
strategic choice of what research to pursue.  
The article is based on a mix of policy and documentary analysis, field work with those 
involved, using surveys, questionnaires, focus groups and other group discussion methods 
and participant observation. It has been a personal and professional journey: it is 25 years 
since I started preparing the first submission I was involved in, as head of a Research and 
Development (R+D) unit, for 1992. I was then commissioned by the Higher Education 
Funding Council for England (HEFCE) to conduct a major project examining the impact of 
that 1992 exercise on individual and institutional behaviour, submitted before, but not 
published until after submissions had been made to the 1996 exercise (McNay, 1997), just 
as the 2001 evaluation was published too late to affect the 2008 exercise. I led submissions 
for 1996, and, in a different institution, for 2001, when I was also a member of a sub-panel 
making judgements on submissions in Education. For 2008 I was an advisor to departments 
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in several universities preparing submissions, as well as having my work included again, as it 
was in 2014. Throughout the period, I continued with a number of smaller research projects 
on research quality assessment, analysing changing policy, institutional strategies and staff 
experiences, and organised major national conferences on the topic. I was a member of the 
panel assessing research bids for the Economic and Social Research Council, and for a major 
initiative – the Teaching and Learning Research Programme. This article draws on those 
experiences and others’ work in various countries to record how successive adaptations 
have changed the landscape of HE in England. I should declare another interest: the two 
most recent staff members in the English Funding Council (HEFCE) with lead responsibility 
for research policy are both former students of mine, one giving considerable credit to that 
experience for his subsequent career progression. 
The article pursues a roughly chronological approach to changes between exercises and 
then treats factors having an impact on the balance of activity at institutional and individual 
levels: research, teaching and management. Some comparisons are drawn with other 
countries. The conclusion is that despite the stated principles underpinning the exercise, 
there has been little coherence, nor continuity between exercises, nor consistency between 
academic areas, nor credibility to those being assessed (RAE, 2001;McNay, 2015). There is 
also a lack of connection between the exercise and other activities of universities and a 
failure to articulate a ‘fit’ with a national strategy for science.  The main positive is in post 
facto transparency whereby the bulk of the submissions are accessible online as are the 
judgements and feedback commentaries from panels (REF, 2014c). This provides a rich 
source for researchers! 
The basic framework: the (changing) rules of the ‘game’ 
My starting point is the 1992 exercise, which is when all HE Institutions could enter 
following system restructuring, including university designation of former polytechnics. All 
were funded by four unitary councils; assessment continued to be UK wide, but funding was 
delegated to the four constituent parts of the UK, since education was a devolved 
responsibility. Before that date the two exercises had been low key, ‘light touch’, a 
monitoring audit rather than the comparative and competitive approach that came to 
dominate in a marketised system with a monopoly customer – the state. In 1986, for 
example, the Research Selectivity Exercise (as it was called initially) asked for responses to a 
four-part questionnaire on income and expenditure, planning priorities and output, with the 
focus mainly at the level of the university as a whole (Bence and Oppenheim, 2005). Only 5 
representative outputs were submitted by each subject area. From 1996, the norm became 
four per person. 
In 1992, funding based on grades awarded in the RAE/REF, known as QR funding – Quality 
Related – was separated from funding for teaching. Previously, UGC universities had been 
given an unhypothecated lump sum to cover both. It was intended to support 
infrastructure, a ‘research environment’, and complemented the other arm of the dual 
support system of state funding of research through research councils, which funded 
projects ranging in size from single researcher enquiries up to major centres with significant 
staff levels. There has been a shift by research councils in recent decades, from responsive 
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funding – reviewing bids from Principal Investigators in open competition – to inviting bids 
within themes agreed with government as it became more directive, linking research to 
national strategic priorities. Until 2008, QR funding was based mainly on overall quality 
ratings of outputs such as articles, artefacts, patents, papers to conferences. Such output 
came from individuals, aggregated into ‘Units of Assessment’ (UoAs) mainly coinciding with 
discipline-based departments. Data on context at unit level – doctoral completions, other 
research income, policies for staff support, strategic plans - could moderate grades at 
threshold points.  Such units got a single overall grade. Funding went to the corporate 
university without conditions attached – an acknowledgement of institutional ‘autonomy’ – 
though expectations were increasingly stated. So, individuals’ output was assessed for a 
departmental/unit grade for institutional funding. Research teams were unrecognised 
elements in the structure of research activity and assessment. For only a handful of elite 
universities did it form a significant element of income: before the trebling and trebling 
again of undergraduate fees, and withdrawal of most funding council support for teaching in 
England, only four universities got more money from QR than from teaching funds. As one 
vice-chancellor/rector put it, the exercises were about ‘fame and fortune’; but not much of 
the latter for many units, despite international level work. Until 1992, funding related to 
student numbers. With extension of coverage, that changed to ‘research active’ staff 
numbers, so as not to fund those not engaged in research, particularly in the newly 
designated  modern universities which did not have a research tradition and had had no 
funding, but which provided most of the growth in student numbers. 
The first exercise in my period required details of all publications by staff being submitted, 
with two indicated as ‘best’ with two others for further examination if needed. The 
assumption was, then, that quantity was a factor – to show that funds were being used 
productively – so, an evaluative/productive approach. My evaluation of impact (McNay, 
1997) showed that journal editors were, as a consequence, deluged with articles, often 
irrelevant to the aims of their journals, and of variable quality. Research findings were 
published on a drip feed basis, with what was called a ‘salami slicing’ of publications to 
maximise the quantitative indicator, as staff ‘played the game’ (Lucas, 2006).  Articles often 
had considerable content overlap with others. Hundreds of new journals appeared, to 
accommodate the surge of submissions as ‘publish or perish’ became a reality for staff when 
publication gives readily visible evidence of work and is used in performance management. 
The evidence of increased research was less convincing than for increased publication, and a 
surge in quality of output was also not evident (Talib, 2000, Bence and Oppenheim, 2004). 
The outcome provoked consternation among traditional universities. The level of core 
funding had not changed significantly despite the doubling of the number of submitting 
institutions. The previously unfunded polytechnics and colleges –  known as ‘modern’ 
universities - produced some good results, and were given funding beyond the small 
supplementary amount earmarked for them, reducing the amount available to their more 
prestigious competitors. (In a later exercise, History at Oxford Brookes University – the 
former polytechnic – outscored its more ancient neighbour, creating a local frisson of 
delight or despair depending on location). 
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For 1996, each staff member identified their four ‘best’ outputs for submission – a shift to 
an evaluative/qualitative approach. In Italy, for the Valutazione della Qualita della Ricerca 
(VQR) exercise,  it had been three for university staff and six for those in Public Research 
Organisations (Bonaccorsi and Malagrini, undated); for the 2011-2014 exercise that reduced 
to two and four respectively. UK grade criteria made much of the proportion of work at 
three levels of quality – international, national, and sub-national - but a single grade was 
awarded, and funding withdrawn from lower graded units. After 1992 results came out, 
there was evidence of internal decisions to allocate income more equally, but perhaps less 
equitably, to support improvement in those lower graded units, and tax those who 
generated it. After 1996, my own unit had its QR allocation halved by senior managers: none 
of the lower graded departments to whom the money was then allocated got a funded 
grade in 2001, and we only just clung on to our funded grade. Investing in weakness is rarely 
a good strategy. The practice faded away. 
Funding was related to grade and numbers of staff submitted – quality x volume, with three 
price levels for different clusters of disciplines. Initially there were 5 grades, with the 
funding gradient a straight line graph. Later, there were 7 and successive exercises cut 
funding from the bottom rungs and changed the funding gradient (it differed across the four 
administrations) (Brown and Carasso, 2013). Such decisions were announced after bids had 
been submitted, which made planning strategies for the bid difficult to calculate a balance 
of advantage between selectivity or inclusivity of all ‘research active’ staff who had the basic 
requirement – four ‘outputs’, of which panel members read between 10 per cent and 50 per 
cent (McNay, 2007). Between 2009 and 2012, the ratio changed annually, so that the ratio 
for 2*, 3* and 4* went from 1:3:7 in 2009-10 to 0:1:4 in 2015-16 (Geuna and Piolatto, 2016). 
2016-17 will see the 3*/4* gap widen further.  Unlike, say, New Zealand, there was no 
requirement for all academic staff to be submitted; nor did individuals get a personal grade.  
When the grade was a single average, the criteria for each grade created traps in their 
wording (McNay, 2003, 2007), again only clarified after results were announced. So a grade 
5 required ‘international excellence in up to half of research and national excellence in 
virtually all of the remainder’: ‘virtually all’ was quantified as 95 per cent; ‘up to half’ 
remained unspecified. A grade average could be dragged down by including too many lower 
quality outputs to the extent that the increase in the quantity multiplier did not compensate 
for the drop in the quality indicator. One major unit dropped to 5 from 5* in 2001 because 
there was seen to be no flexibility in ‘international excellence in more than half of research 
and national excellence in [all of] the remainder’; a handful of outputs, out of several 
hundred, fell below national excellence. That calculation of the equation became 
increasingly important as the funding gradient steepened, under pressure from government 
(Geuna and Piolatto, 2016); getting it wrong could mean paying an expensive price for 
motivational staff management.  
The QR grade, though dominated by outputs, was sometimes crucially affected by context 
factors described above. I had experience as a panel member of this: one UoA in a modern 
university was held down a grade because the activity was new, but good despite that, and 
an older university was given a higher grade than output merited because it was ‘well found’ 
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– i.e. had academic capital and a past record. I can make a case for those decisions being 
reversed on the basis of equity, with allowance for context in the same way as students 
from less advantaged background should be given credit for performance for overcoming 
that, and regret that I did not make such a case more forcefully at the time. 
Little changed between 1996 and 2001. User representatives were introduced to some 
panels, with a variety of experiences, many critical about the attitudes of other panel 
members, and the exclusionary nature of academic discourse (Lewis, 2002; McNay, 1998b). 
The funding gradient steepened with fewer grades attracting any money, and a small 
number of institutions getting the bulk. In England, in 2005, four - Oxford, Cambridge, 
Imperial College and University College, London - got 29 per cent of the total allocated for 
research, but only 6.5 per cent of that for teaching. In Wales, Cardiff has consistently had 
nearly 60 per cent of QR funds. This is true of other systems using RQA approaches to 
funding: in New Zealand, 2 universities – Auckland and Otago - got 51 per cent of research 
funding in 2013 (TEC, 2013), despite one objective being ‘to prevent the undue 
concentration of funding’ (Ministry of Education, 2013). That objective disappeared soon 
after (Ministry of Education, 2014). In Portugal, half the universities are excluded from 
funding after the first round of a two-stage process (Deem, 2016). 
For 2008 there was another development in the UK – an objective ‘to fund excellence 
wherever it is found’, which the modern universities welcomed as a commitment to a more 
equitable recognition of their developing profiles and a re-balancing of distribution of funds. 
The single grade, which had concealed the range of quality behind an average, was replaced 
by a profile with four levels, showing the percentage of work deemed to fall within each 
band.  There were some derisive comments about criteria applied in defining ‘world-
leading’, which Johnston (2008), another former vice-chancellor, wanted to show 
revolutionary science, a paradigm shift, mainly beyond achievement in a 5-year perspective. 
Within the – perhaps less exigent - framework applied, 150 out of 159 UK institutions had at 
least one unit with at least 5% of its work deemed to be ‘world-leading’, based on rigour, 
significance and originality. Adams and Gurney (2010) note wryly that ‘it appears that the 
policy of selective funding, while leading to a fair (sic) degree of concentration of research 
funds, had not led to quite the concentration of research excellence that might have been 
expected’. Despite further adjustment of the grade:funding ratio to favour the top grades, 
2016-7 allocations per full-time equivalent (FTE) academic show a reduction of over 5 per 
cent for Oxford, Cambridge and Imperial College, as submitted staff numbers were reduced 
to protect the headline quality profile, and modern universities included more staff and 
achieved considerably  improved grades, so claiming a higher proportion of the funds 
available in the zero sum game. Some more than trebled their allocation from the previous 
year (Ruckenstein et al, 2016). 
In the 2008 exercise, three elements of output, context and esteem factors were separately 
graded. Esteem factors were new, and covered such things as prizes, fellowships, office in 
learned societies, editorial board membership, encouraging academic citizenship activities. 
The balance of contribution to the overall grade of these three factors was left to panels to 
decide, leading to considerable variation (RAE, 2006; McNay, 2007). For 2014, esteem 
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disappeared, and the contributory elements became output, environment and impact, 
weighted on a standardised ratio across all panels of 65:15:20 and separately reported and 
funded. ‘Impact’ complemented ‘significance’, the latter being seen as recognition within 
academia (probably through citation counts); impact covered effects beyond academia: 
‘change or benefit to the economy, society, culture, public policy or services, health, the 
environment or quality of life’ (REF, 2014), and was assessed on the basis of ‘reach’ and 
‘significance’. Environment covered strategy, resources and infrastructure with criteria of 
‘vitality and sustainability’. 
The unit discussed above, where I had had regrets, had a higher grade in Education in 2014 
for output than its more prestigious neighbour in the alphabetic order listings of results, but 
lost out in the overall score on the other two factors, so the overall grade reversed their 
rank order, raising issues about how quality is defined and what was being judged. As Deem 
(2016) comments: ‘research has become what REF measures’. The environment grade 
depended heavily on previous funding and ‘research capital’. Impact – a concept I support 
and campaigned for in the context of professional research – was assessed through case 
studies of evidence from the period 2008-2013 of research done since 1993, in the same, 
submitting, institution. So, anybody who had moved institution in a 20 year period (as had I) 
lost at least part of their claim to impact. The institution/s they had left could still claim the 
credit for the work of staff who had left, because the ownership of research was seen as 
resting with the institutions. This also meant that the ‘stars’ recruited in a short term 
perspective to boost profile could not count for impact, but their outputs could be used 
because they belonged to them and so were portable. This raises questions about 
ownership of intellectual property. 
There have been other issues related to the means by which judgements are reached: while 
panel feedback about what quality research involves in Education stresses large, 
quantitative projects based on developing and using large statistical data bases, which 
require a team approach, for 2014 the number of people from the same UoA who could 
submit the same output/article as evidence of quality of their contribution was limited to 
three across the social sciences. If co-authors came from elsewhere in the university, and 
submitted to a different UoA, or were from another university, there were no limits. So a 
leader’s strategy to encourage colleagues to collaborate internally, based on approaches of 
previous exercises, was undermined. The criteria for impact specifically excluded impact on 
one’s teaching – a difficult hurdle for those who research teaching in higher education! 
Esteem factors, which may have assessed that among other things through academic peers, 
disappeared as a specific element, possibly in to the ‘environment’ narrative. Impact was 
judged on case studies, with a minimum of two for all submissions and one required for 
approximately every 10 staff submitted over 15. This led to some staff not being submitted, 
because the threshold would be passed to require an extra case study which could not be 
demonstrated or, perhaps, not at an acceptable level for the four point scale (Kerridge, 
2015). 23 per cent of subpanel members were user representatives or impact assessors. 
They were more generous and less fine-grained in their grades than academics, leading to 
concern about a possible lack of rigorous audit trail of inflated claims (Deem, 2016, Oancea, 
2016). Greenhalgh (2015) reviewed 162 case studies linked to community-based health 
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sciences (Panel A2), aiming to define a template of ‘good’ impact. She found that claims of 
impact on clinical guidelines or clinical practice were not supported by data on outcomes - 
in morbidity or mortality rates - from such changes. In a quarter of submissions, no active 
efforts to achieve impact were described. Work by Derrick and Samuel (2016) also casts 
doubt on the validity and reliability of impact assessor judgements across health sciences.  
The user representatives and impact assessors in Education raised queries about ‘the value 
for money of such a time consuming exercise’ (REF 2014).  
There was also a risk that network power (Bourdieu, 1988, Kahler, 2009) would have 
operated in their selection, and that partners in large organisations, working with higher 
rated units – the network from which members were dominantly drawn - would be over-
represented. Previously, professional research had been under-regarded, a point made in 
my 1997 report and accepted by HEFCE in its response (HEFCE, 1997). This was still true 
nearly 20 years later, according to a report endorsed at parliamentary and ministerial level 
(Furlong and Oancea, 2005; ESRC, 2004). ‘Near-market’ research had been excluded from 
submission; now this could count for 20 per cent of the quality grade. Conversely, 
encouragement to be active in the wider research community – learned societies, editorial 
boards, school research presentations – was discouraged because it brought no rewards 
recognised in the utilitarian world of politicians and senior managers, who expected a 
different balance of effort. 
Across the exercise, judgements are made by panels of ‘peers’ from within higher 
education, mainly from the UK, even though funded work has now to be deemed ‘world-
leading’(4*), or at least of ‘international quality’ (3*); being ‘internationally recognised’ (2*), 
whatever it means, is not enough for funding, but is difficult to judge from a domestic 
viewpoint. For 2014, international members were added to the four main panels, though 
not enough – 36 units of assessment, down from 69 in 2008, shared 23 people - to give a full 
international perspective on those terms in the sub-panels where grades were determined 
(Deem, 2016). Those terms are not used in grading environment, nor impact, but  four point 
scales are used for both, suggesting similarity, and the terms are used to cover ‘overall 
performance’ of a unit when all three are aggregated into a blended grade. This exaggerated 
the implied quality of work in headline reports, since the ratings for environment and 
impact were much higher than for outputs – see Table 1. 
  Table 1 here 
The impact scores for Science and Medical subjects were much higher than for social 
sciences, with an average of 60 per cent gaining 4* ratings for both elements. The scores for 
the elements other than outputs were much higher than the two used in 2008, though they 
are not directly comparable. So, across all disciplines the proportion of outputs getting a 4* 
rating went from 14 per cent to 22 percent, but overall performance scores at 4* went from 
17 per cent to 30 per cent, a much bigger rise, because of shifts in the other two elements. 
For example, in Education, in 2008, the top score for 4* grade in context was 75 per cent 
and only 5 institutions had a score of 50 per cent or more. In 2014, 18 institutions scored 50 
per cent or more, of which 8 scored 100 per cent for their Utopian environment. Similarly, 
for esteem the top rating for 4* was 40 per cent, awarded to 2 units; in 2014, 27 units 
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scored 40 per cent or more and 3 scored 100 per cent for impact. This shows differences 
across time and panels, yet two of the key principles for the exercises claimed by the 
funding councils are consistency across panels and continuity between successive exercises 
(RAE2001). The validity and reliability of the process are both called in to question by these 
data, yet little is said because university staff do not want to challenge the upward 
trajectory of the quality scores. In Deem’s (2016) view, the environment narratives have had 
less and less scrutiny, and the transparency that is one of the best things about the 
exercises, reveals what might be labelled ’creative accounting’ in the case study claims for 
impact, where many institutions brought in specialist authors to sex them up (Oancea, 
2016). 
In Italy, there are fixed quotas for the four grades, so normative approaches are used rather 
than the supposedly objective criterion referenced approach in the UK. The top 20 per cent 
are ‘excellent’, the next 20 per cent are ‘good’, the next 10 per cent ‘adequate’ and the 
bottom half, ‘limited’. These grades inform only about 2 per cent of funding, of which, in 
2013, 63 per cent went to the top quintile (Geuna and Piolatto, 2016), which may reduce 
the temptation to ‘game’ the exercise by packing the sample with lower quality work to 
improve the chances of a higher grade for relatively better work. The financial impact of the 
Portuguese exercise in 2013 is more significant where, in a two-stage process, half of units 
do not get through to the second stage and lose all funding: a consequence of restricted 
funds in an economy under challenge. Of those that did get to stage 2, none were given the 
top rating of ‘exceptional’ (Deem, 2016)  
Means and Ends 
Such changes to processes and data requirements reflected the technicist approach 
adopted by the UK funding councils responsible for the exercises. They were irritating and 
disruptive to good research planning, but if there was adjusting of the means - of process - a 
more serious problem with the exercises has been over ends - their lack of clear objectives 
(McNay, 2015a). This distinction is similar to that made by Glaser (2016) in his article in this 
issue between strategic autonomy and operational autonomy. The first objective set was ‘to 
inform funding decisions’, which simply shifts the question to the objectives of funding 
strategy. The operational strategy has been ever increasing concentration of funding in 
fewer institutions. This may indicate an unstated intention to protect the ‘elite’ institutions 
as a subset, when student participation is now at mass levels in Trow’s (1974) typology. 
League tables, which weight research heavily, create pressure to keep that elite group in the 
top ranks internationally, the level to which comparisons and competition have now moved 
for such universities.  At a conference I organised after the 1996 exercise, the head of the 
funding council admitted that ‘you never know how it will all turn out’, which aligns with 
several writers on unexpected consequences (e.g. Merton, 1936, Elton, 2000, Krucken, 
2014), and then claimed that one objective was ‘to improve research quality’ (McNay, 
1998). That has never been stated in any official documents. Statements from HEFCE 
officials did retrospectively claim a causal link with some developments – accountability for 
public investment in research and its benefits, the establishment of yardsticks and 
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benchmarks, and leading a cultural shift, though, they noted, the last more among 
managers than researchers! (HEFCE, 2014).  
In 2014, the introduction of ‘impact’ was overtly intended to change behaviour at 
institutional, departmental and individual level (HEFCE, 2009), though in what way was not 
specified. Funding remained a dominant element, and there appeared to be an axiomatic 
assumption, articulated in other policy arenas, that competition would improve quality – a 
tenet of New Public Management, as Glaser (2016) notes in his contribution to this volume. 
Since the total fund was fixed, there was a zero sum game, and funding for lower Q levels 
was removed or reduced in successive exercises.  
The lack of clarity over ends was compounded by changes in factors to be used as evidence 
of quality and by lack of agreement on means for judging quality. There was a constant 
debate, which Italy has also experienced (Bertocchi et al, 2014) as to whether greater use of 
metrics would be more efficient, and just as effective, as peer review, if not more so (OECD, 
2004: Sastry and Bekhradnia, 2006; Donovan, 2007; Scott, 2007). In the UK, pressure to use 
metrics comes from politicians who, within New Public Management approaches want easy 
qualitative indicators. This goes back for more than a decade, but whenever an independent 
review of the issue is commissioned the outcome is to keep peer review and metrics in a 
hybrid or symbiotic relationship, with the lead role being taken by peer review. This is true 
of the latest independent review, which was published just before the deadline for 
submission of this article (Stern, 2016). McNay (2009: 42-44) has a brief summary of the 
claimed strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches in isolation. Wilsdon (2015) has 
an extensive literature review of several hundred articles, admittedly mainly from English 
speaking contexts, concluding that ‘individual metrics give significantly different outcomes 
from the REF peer review process, showing that metrics cannot provide a like-for-like 
replacement for REF peer review’.  Academics are divided, often along disciplinary lines: the 
Swedish Research Council has recently proposed that funding should be based on peer 
review through the FOCUS model every six years, to replace the current metrics base. 
Government response is awaited, but the academic union, SULF – Swedish Association of 
University Teachers - is opposed on grounds of efficiency and effectiveness, supported by an 
Italian academic working in a Swedish university, who had reviewed papers in the last 
ANVUR exercise to arrive at ratings consistent with the number of citations on Google 
Scholar (Maukola, 2016). Baccini and De Nicolao (2016) challenge the conclusion by ANVUR 
on the Italian exercise that outcomes from the two approaches had a good degree of 
agreement; they claim that the use of the dual system may have introduced biases in the 
results. They agree with Wilsdon, which is significant because he has recently been asked to 
chair an expert group on alternative metrics to feed in to the Open Science Policy Platform 
of the European Union. 
   Figure 1 about here 
If one develops a matrix plotting clarity of and agreement on ends/objectives of the 
exercise, including quality criteria, against degree of robustness and acceptance of means, 
the four quadrants produce different behaviours: 
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- 1. ends and means both clear and agreed: rational decision making. This was the 
assumption of the funding council, seeing the approach as helping financial 
accounting and operating discretely, without recognising the impact on other actors, 
nor setting the exercise in context, relating to wider national science policy, nor to 
teaching, consultancy and other university activities.  
- 2. ends defined, agreed and consistent; means less so: trial and error 
experimentation. This is seen in the changes between exercises recorded above such 
as the change in the funding model, the inclusion of user representatives in 
judgements, reduced recognition of jointly authored papers, the exclusion of 
teaching as an arena of impact. 
- 3. disputes over quality and ends of the exercise, but confidence in particular means 
and measures. This resulted in a lot of lobbying by what Watson (2009)  labelled the 
HE ‘gangs’, and Kahler (2009) the exercise of ‘network power’, particularly as 
traditional universities tried to retain their dominance, resisting impact as a criterion 
of quality and pressing for quality to be deemed an organisational characteristic, and 
so proposing the exclusion of  units below a minimum critical mass, advocating the 
inclusion of all eligible staff in a submission, and supporting  selectivity in funding 
with its exclusionary consequences. This was helped by the membership of panels, 
dominated by those from research intensive universities – the dominant network - 
with very few having more than one member from a modern university, and 
occasional total absences. Those who set the canon and established the parameters 
of disciplines and methodologies acted as gatekeepers, judging work that might 
challenge them, and sometimes keeping the gate closed. This is evident in the most 
recent review (Stern, 2016), which supports those changes; the review steering 
group had no members from modern universities, but six from the Russell Group of 
research dominated universities, plus one from Princeton 
- 4. extended lack of agreement: ‘garbage can’ behaviour [Cohen, March and Olsen, 
1972) with changing actors/governments in an uncertain decision making process, 
inconsistent processes and conflicts of requirements, conflicting evidence and 
opinion on the balance of qualitative and quantitative data. Until recently, this had 
been evident in Australia, with several plans for change never implemented as the 
political pendulum swung. The UK system comes close, particularly when changing 
politicians try to micro-manage. 
Designed to distort? 
Staff in the funding councils adopted a mix of 1 and 2. The English council is a funding body, 
not a strategy steering board, they insisted. That led to problems inherent in design factors 
being denied, ignored or neglected. The simple technicist approach survived through several 
exercises, despite evidence suggesting the need for fuller review. The HEFCE review 
following the 2014 exercise, despite criticisms, including my own, also intended little change 
(McKenzie and Gallodi, 2016): a 5* grade for work better than ‘world leading’ – perhaps the 
USA hyperbole of ‘stellar’ might serve; an increase in the impact of impact to 25 per cent of 
the overall score. That review was stopped when government announced its own (Stern, 
2016). Their policy preference is seen as aiming at reducing the cost of the exercise through 
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more emphasis on metrics, a policy proposed by all shades of government since before the 
2008 exercise, but resisted by academics on the balance of evidence (Wilsdon, 2015). That, 
too, ignores other, more important, design defects. 
Disconnected 
One major issue is that the exercise has been conducted as a discrete activity, not located in 
the broader landscape and operational activity of universities. At a workshop at the 2008 
conference of research managers, I conducted a quick survey on the links between research 
and other activities. In a group of 60, no more than three indicated their institution made 
good, clear links between research and any of…teaching, enterprise, users, knowledge 
transfer, economic development, regional regeneration, international competitiveness. 
Things may have moved on since then, but that was 15 years into the period under review 
and after five rounds of assessment. 
Impact on teaching 
My report (McNay, 1997) pointed to issues of concern, acknowledged by the funding council 
(HEFCE, 1997), but which remain unresolved: treatment of interdisciplinary work, 
recognition of professional research and, particularly, the damaging effect on teaching. 62 
per cent of heads of department in my survey said the effects on teaching had been 
negative. It became low priority because the RAE/REF produced extra funding for quality 
without extra productivity, but extra income for teaching could only come through extra 
students, and quality teaching rarely led to promotion. Only 28 years later, the 
government’s consumerist perspective led it to recognise that ‘because some universities 
see their reputation, their standing in league tables and their marginal funding as being 
principally determined by scholarly output, this can result in teaching becoming a poor 
cousin to research in parts of our system’ (DBIS 2015, para 1.10). At institution and 
departmental level, the elite universities emphasised their commitment to ‘research-led 
teaching’. This is not tested by quality assurance of teaching, and risks distorting teaching to 
give more prominence to research – often beyond undergraduate level – than to the needs 
of students and expectations of employers, those two being the main ‘clients’ of 
universities. Evidence of this was offered by Times Higher Education (Havergal, 2016), where 
the data team modelled the potential results of TEF using the government’s indicated 
approach, and produced a league table. Cambridge fell outside the top ten, Oxford outside 
the top 20 (below Oxford Brookes), and University College London, St. Andrews, LSE and 
King’s College London well outside the top 50, with less familiar names in the top ten: 
Loughborough, Aston, De Montfort, Swansea, Kent, Coventry, Keele, Surrey, Bath and 
Lancaster. 
Government intends to introduce a Teaching Excellence Framework to equalise esteem and 
effort, ‘to bring better balance…including stimulating greater linkages between teaching and 
research’ (1.13) because ‘research and teaching should be recognised as mutually 
reinforcing activities’ (1.3). Given the reduction of government investment in R+D, there 
may be a view that better graduates will stimulate economic productivity (a key recurrent 
theme) as an alternative strategy. But…the only reward for excellence is permission to 
   14 
 
charge students higher fees, just as state financial support to students is being reduced. This 
article is not about the TEF, but it has problems not dissimilar to REF. The intention is to use 
metrics, but the three proposed, based on current data availability are: student retention 
and completion, graduate employment, and student satisfaction. The government’s paper 
acknowledges, briefly, that ‘these metrics are largely proxies rather than direct measures of 
quality…and there are issues around how robust they are’ (3.13). That is very true – all are 
contaminated by factors beyond the university’s control. Nevertheless the government 
proposes to adopt the trial and error approach of quadrant 2 above. It needs to learn from 
previous mistakes. Yet a technical consultation on  for the operation of the Teaching 
Excellence Framework has been issued, not for the first year, where  the intention is to 
press ahead with that in 2016-17 before claiming it works and implementing it fully in 2017-
18. The consultation is on Year Two, with replies needed before the start of year one. 
Beyond that, ‘the development of future iterations of the TEF will draw upon lessons 
learned from Year Two’ (DBIS, 2016:40, paragraph 156). Such government attitudes to 
evaluation are seen elsewhere: Glaser (this volume) records the decision in Germany to 
continue the Excellence Initiative before an international panel of experts had conducted its 
evaluation, and despite views that it caused imbalance between large and small units, 
between research and teaching and between the authority of professors and managers. 
RAE/REF had a system wide impact on teaching, because poor results on research 
assessment, with consequent reductions in research funding, were followed by closure of 
teaching departments, so that, in some areas, courses in key strategic subjects were not 
easily accessed and the supply of skilled personnel in some regions was reduced, as well as 
relevant research activity (AUT, 2003). That effect is also imbalanced, geographically, in 
favour of London and the south-east (Adams and Smith, 2004), contrary to successive 
governments’ espoused commitment to greater regional development, currently to a 
‘northern powerhouse’, where support to productivity – a major driver of higher education 
policy – is more needed The concentration of research funding means that many 
departments have become effectively ‘teaching only’, with consequences for staff 
recruitment and deployment. That aligns with the reduced requirements in the new Higher 
Education and Research for designation as a university, aimed at encouraging private 
entrants to the market, since they are not required to have any research activity, a major, 
imbalancing, revision of the concept of a university in the UK since the second half of the 
last century (Robbins, 1963).   
Impact on research 
Conversely, the framework of assessment panels was based on teaching - the subject 
discipline structures of undergraduate degrees, increasingly not relevant even there. 
Researchers working in multi-disciplinary project teams had to disconnect from the team 
and the context of their work, to be assessed in a structure not fit for that purpose – a basic 
criterion of quality. Mega-panels were developed to review work in clusters of allegedly 
cognate disciplines, but those involved are sceptical about their efficacy (Deem, 2016). For 
2008, Education was linked with Psychology and Sports Studies, presumably on some 
memory of a private school education based on mens sana in corpore sano.  
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The exercise is judgemental, not developmental, looking back on performance, not forward 
on potential. Yet those at 4* level probably started with some 2* outputs; it is unclear how 
the exercise supports that progress. I have noted the oral commitment to improving quality, 
but its absence from official documents. There has been a matching lack of overt 
commitment to developing research capacity. Despite increases in the numbers of academic 
staff in the system, the number of staff submitted has declined since 1996, in Education 
from over 2500 to 1440 full-time equivalent staff (-40 per cent). In Sociology, the number of 
units submitting fell from 39 in 2008 to 29 in 2014, and staff numbers from 927 to 704, a 
drop of 24 per cent. Part of that is down to a shift in staff contracts. In 2014, for the first 
time, while there was a 4.5 per cent increase in numbers of academic staff from the 
previous year, as recruitment for REF submission reached a peak, academic staff with job 
descriptions embracing both teaching and research fell and became a minority (48.6 per 
cent). There has been an increase in functional specialism (Locke et al, 2016): over 3,200 
extra staff were appointed on research only contracts, which would include ‘stars’, and 
nearly 6,000 on teaching only contracts, to cope with increased undergraduate numbers 
after the ‘cap’ controlling enrolment levels was removed.  That last figure will have included 
some switched from a dual role to reduce the base of REF- eligible staff, and so increase the 
apparent intensity of research activity if numbers of those submitted as a proportion of 
those potentially eligible becomes a metric in the future. Productivity also declined: staff 
submitted an average of 3.75 outputs in 2008; in 2014, this fell to 3.41, partly because of 
greater use of exceptional circumstances provision. Nor are prospects good, since half of 
full-time PhD students are not UK citizens and many will be forced to return to their home 
countries because of xenophobic visa controls by the Home Office. That will worsen, now 
that the UK will leave the European Union. High debts from high undergraduate fees make 
UK graduates reluctant to incur more through immediate doctoral study.  The original policy 
of enhancing value for money is increasingly called in to question (McNay, 2015b). 
The UK government ideological axiom, that competition improves quality, so the aim does 
not need to be stated was disputed in a survey of some 300 academic staff (McNay, 2008): 
52 per cent of respondents agreed that ‘quality assurance processes have encouraged low-
risk conformity at the expense of innovation, independence and “difference”’. That 
confirmed findings in Germany and Australia (Laudel, 2006, Glaser and Laudel, 2005). The 
UK Commission on the Social Sciences, set up by the learned societies in the field, was 
severely critical: 
The academy treadmill, driven by excessive accountability burdens, the Research 
Assessment Exercise and other factors, has reduced the originality and quality of 
much academic research and constrained interaction with various communities. 
(CSS, 2003) 
There is also a belief that competition produces diversity because of an entrepreneurial 
drive to develop new products (Geiger, 1986, in Horta et al, 2008). The conclusion by Horta 
and colleagues was that a single excellence model for assessment promotes isomorphism – 
a drift to conformity to a norm. One vice-chancellor/rector, and a former head of the English 
funding council, claims the English have a genius for turning diversity into hierarchy; the 
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reduction in numbers of research groups with any significant QR funding will reduce that 
diversity. Perceptions of panels’ views will add to that. Staff spend time trying to detect 
panel members’ preferences/biases and adapting their work to match. In Education, the 
panel feedback (REF, 2016),as well as favouring large scale quantitative projects, suggests a 
lack of sympathy for professional classroom based research, condemning it for lack of 
theoretical rigour, when action research and other approaches develop grounded theory 
through rigorous field work on a Mode 2 approach linked to real world problems (Gibbons 
et al, 1994). Yet, there are a diversity of excellences, depending on purpose and fit with 
circumstances.  For 2014, Psychology was located in the Panel covering social sciences, 
when much work fitted better with the Science Panel, but that meant lower funding for 
clinical research in mental health than applied for similar work on physical health 
(Matthews, 2016b).  There had been previous claims that lab-based research in Psychology 
scored more highly than other methodologies appropriate to different branches of the field 
(Marks, 1995), as there was for econometrics scoring more highly than less statistical 
approaches (Harley and Lee, 1997), linked to a constricting ‘approved’ list of journals, a 
practice that continues in some panels. Yet the Australian Research Council has now 
withdrawn such lists, since most of the work cited in the listed journals comes from work in 
journals outside the ‘approved’ outlets. The risk of imbalancing the nature of the subject 
was clear.  
Such perceptions also continued the guessing game that endured for several iterations 
about which panel to choose, given the ‘garbage can’ of turnover of panel members and 
variable criteria and standards (McNay, 2007). Deem (2016) records the disputes within 
panel meetings, drawing on Lamont’s work (Lamont, 2009). Sato and Endo (2014) conclude 
that the ‘cat and mouse’ process of trying to model panel preferences has led to ‘formative 
reactivity’ to gain better grades. They see this as sub-optimisation, where there is ‘a 
mismatch between what is good for each HEI and what is good for society as a whole’ (p91). 
Such ‘gaming’ may be endemic to such processes: Middleton (2009) uses ‘PBRF-able’ (fit to 
submit to the Performance Based Research Fund assessment exercise) to define ‘the 
process in which activities and research outputs of academics in New Zealand tend to be 
moulded into the patterns that are expected to attain favourable assessment results’ (in 
Sato and Endo, 2014, p95). Rebora and Turri (2013), comparing the UK and Italy, claim that 
institutional leaders use New Public Management approaches to orient staff behaviour to 
perceived external requirements: neo-organisational sociology and operational control 
theory suggest that organisations adapt and imitate to achieve acceptance and legitimacy.  
Matthews (2016a) records the views of Jonathan Adams, the leading researcher in this field, 
on the risk that concentration of funding in a small number of universities brings: 
‘The peak [of research excellence] only works because there is a platform of very 
good research supported right across the country in different regions, areas and 
institutions. You can’t just restrict your focus on the elite institutions, [without 
investing in others]; you don’t have a feedthrough of younger researchers [because 
progression is usually within the university of first degree study – transfer to 
research intensive universities is less usual]…A loss of structural diversity is a loss of 
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capacity to respond flexibly when priorities change or when opportunities appear. 
Diversity builds in sustainable performance’. 
Yet, as noted, the response of government, through HEFCE (less so in the other three 
administrations) to evidence showing that concentrated funding did not work well, was…to 
try to increase such concentration. That is reminiscent of the English abroad, when they are 
not understood: shout LOUDER. 
Adams also criticised looking only backwards without strategic forethought: ‘awarding more 
funds to institutions that did well last year is a safe bet only so long as next year looks 
similar’, his report says (Digital Science, 2015). The report also recommends a diversity of 
funding streams, so attempting to pre-empt likely government policy of moving the REF to 
the research councils. Such a move is now included in the Bill before parliament. 
One quantifiable indicator of isomorphism is in profiles of outputs, and here there has been 
a shift in outputs submitted towards journal articles: another imbalancing. The relative 
volume of articles among submitted outputs grew from 62 per cent in 1996 to 75 per cent in 
2008 and further in 2014. Outputs declining in prominence are: conference papers in 
technology – a quick way to get results out in to the field given long journal lead times, 
though excluded from some citation indices used to provide metrics; and scholarly 
monographs in the social sciences and humanities, also excluded from citation indices 
(Adams and Gurney, 2014). In Education, between 1996 and 2014, the percentage of 
outputs which were journal articles went from 40 per cent to 78 per cent, with a decline in 
reports for external bodies, and in website content. In Business and Management, journals 
as a share of output went from 59 per cent to over 95 per cent in the same period. The 
report from Digital Science (2015) cites the journal rankings of the Association of Business 
Schools as exhibiting a lack of diversity and favouring mono-disciplinary research, another 
congruence with Germany (Glaser, 2016). The conclusion was that ‘this may result in 
researchers tending to comply with disciplinary authority and be pressured into writing 
papers to fit a narrow core of …journals’ (p5).My colleagues at Greenwich are currently 
subject to such pressures from senior management. Other units were more resistant to 
pressures: in history, in 2014, books rose in prominence from 2008, though the longer term 
trend was for journal articles to gain in share from 30 per cent in 1996 to over 40 per cent in 
2014. Similarly, in Area Studies, articles rose slowly but steadily from 34 per cent (1996) to 
57 per cent (2014). (I am grateful to Ikuya Sato for these figures, drawn from 
www.ref.ac.uk/2014output). ). It is not clear how any process based mainly on bibliometrics 
would capture output not held in data banks, producing one imbalancing on the nature of 
‘output’, since most output other than journal articles, and not all of those, is not included 
and so not used in citation counts. Another imbalancing is that work in languages other than 
English is usually excluded, so pushing those working in other languages down any league 
tables that use this data as part of their criteria. 
A later report from Digital Science (2016), which appeared as I prepared to submit this 
article, drew on 921,254 outputs from the exercises from 1992 to 2014, plus references 
included in 6737 non-confidential impact case studies. It reports two main findings across 
the four main panels of Science, Engineering, Social Science and Arts/Humanities: 
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- It confirmed the trends reported above, including the drop in using conference 
papers as outputs. In Engineering this went from 26.9% to 7.9% in the period; for the 
other three panels, the 2014 figure was under 1%. Books and chapters in both 
Science and Engineering went for over 13% to under 1%; in social science from 46% 
to 15.9%. The report suggests the shift was out of conference proceedings for 
engineering, from mono graphs for social sciences and from media for arts. Patents 
and artefacts will also have features less, as well as commissioned research reports. 
- The output cited to show impact outcomes differed significantly from that used to 
show academic excellence. A minority of 42% of references used in impact case 
studies had also been submitted as outputs to any of the exercises, though the figure 
appears to be higher in professional disciplines, which is logical. That emphasises the 
dual audience for work and underlines the need for a ‘double discourse’ as 
respondents to my work (McNay, 1997) emphasised. Yet, again, professional journals 
often have lower status in citation indices. Or are excluded altogether; that needs to 
change to redress the imbalance. 
For the ANVUR exercise covering 2004-2010, 73.5 per cent of ‘products’ were articles and 
19.9 per cent were books or chapters of books (Bonaccorsi and Malgarini, undated). One 
characteristic that emerged in my early work (McNay, 1997) is the impact on research 
publishing, and then on research focus, of the hegemony of the English language in citation 
counts, so that researchers on the continental mainland publish less in their native 
languages, which has an obvious effect on dissemination and knowledge transfer and 
research use, and the neglect of local issues in trying for ‘international’ quality, relevance 
and impact. 
The periodic batch processing model creates further reactive behaviours. Publications peak 
before the census date and decline after it, perhaps as staff get back to doing research to 
generate the next batch. But the fixed period may discourage blue skies research, arising 
from the curiosity that is a strong motivational force for researchers. There is no guarantee 
of ‘results’ before a deadline, so there is pressure to do work which has a shorter horizon 
and may be more limited. The fixed period, compounded by the lack of continuity and 
certainty between exercises, also fosters a serialist/episodic approach to strategic planning 
and directive approaches to staff management based on a target culture. From the start, 
one major impact of the exercises has been on management (Williams, 1991, McNay, 1997), 
as it has been in Germany (Glaser, this volume). For most departments and their 
universities, QR income is marginal at best, but the exercise has a symbolic value for both 
staff, who want to benchmark against the best, and managers looking to polish the 
institutional brand and league table position. The next two sections consider the managed 
and their managers. 
Impact on staff 
I have already noted some impacts on academic staff. Many whose output is judged 
internally to be of only (sic) 2* quality – ‘internationally recognised’ – will not be submitted 
and so deemed not ‘research active’. Many research intensive universities were draconian in 
adopting such measures, aiming to improve their headline quality profile as REF income 
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became a smaller element in overall budgets. There may be other reasons – or rather 
causes, because they are only ‘reasonable’ within a framework without a duty of care to 
employees: work that does not fit the strategic narrative of the submission, even though it is 
high quality (Lucas, 2006); or where submission of, say, the twenty-first staff member would 
require a further impact case study, which cannot be developed. To boost submissions, 
there is an active trade in recruiting ‘stars’, many from outside the UK – making the lack of 
encouragement to development of younger staff, noted above, even more serious. This is 
similar to the football transfer market, where big money is paid to imported stars without 
sufficient matching investment to ‘grow’ local talent. In research, many such stars are not 
fully committed to developing others. They continue to pursue single-mindedly their own 
career, and are often absent from campus. 
Thomas (2007), another vice-chancellor, is scathing about such ‘star based’ tactics: 
Even a superficial analysis shows such investment incapable of producing an 
economically sustainable return…A sort of boom and bust cycle occurs with major 
investment before the [exercise] and significant retrenchment afterwards because 
the outcome has not delivered the expected increase in income(44) 
Meanwhile, other staff survive. Academics, including researchers, are remarkably resistant 
to attempts to change their behaviour (Trowler, 1998). Those in professional fields often 
have a double pressure, first to continue activity in their field, where their performance had 
been a factor in recruitment, and which is often essential to continuing professional 
recognition, in some cases needed to be able to teach on courses leading to a licence to 
practise. Yet they are also expected to develop a research profile with, sometimes, a PhD, 
rare among such professionals, being required before appointment. Boyd and Smith (2016) 
surveyed staff across departments serving health professions and found that only 17 per 
cent aligned with the established policy to focus on research activity. 39 per cent were 
subverting policy in operation by various stratagems, with 4 per cent simply rejecting it. The 
rest – 40 per cent – are labelled ‘dissonant’ being out of sympathy with the policy but 
slowly/reluctantly adapting to its requirements. That often had high personal cost.   One of 
my projects (McNay, 2007) highlighted four groups:  
- the confident/assertive, who were good enough to set their own agenda, be 
independent and entrepreneurial, usually working in highly graded units; 
- the carefree/autonomous, also setting their own agenda, but in low graded units 
with no funding, so that managers were grateful for anything, often done in private 
time; 
- the controlled/oppressed, driven by others, where managers were desperate to 
improve scores, by whatever means, or were fearful of dropping a high grade and 
believed in ‘strong’ management. 
- the positive, who welcomed pressure from assessment and a motivator, wanted to 
see how they compared against a benchmark set (difficult with grades not given ast 
individual level) and had a supportive ‘fit’ with their location. 
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Leathwood and Read (2013) use a three-part categorisation of contestation, compliance 
and complicity, with staff almost universally contesting policy particularly over small-
scale, critical, innovative projects, many with a feminist perspective, which were under 
threat, with early career researchers a group under extra pressure. And yet… 
…despite high levels of contestation, almost all…were complying with the demands 
of research audit and performativity, often at significant personal cost. Compliance 
[was] seen as being the only way to continue to do the research they loved, and to 
remain in employment [p1172). 
Impact on management and the impact of management 
Middle managers then become complicit in promoting this compliance, to protect staff from 
penalties. Even those within departments scoring 100 per cent at 4* on environment ratings 
are not exempt, as one of my research respondents reported: 
The approach was to move to be ‘selective’ this time round, having been ‘inclusive’ 
in the last RAE. This was achieved through a centralisation of decision-making where 
decisions were not effectively open to challenge. No senior member of the School 
questioned that the game had to be played according to the rules (though some 
whinged about the rules) so of course we became agents of the state. (McNay, 2014, 
p31) 
The fact that grades continue to improve is seen as justification for such management 
approaches, but Thomas (2007), is again sceptical as well as critical: 
…evidence of a causal relationship between the RAE audit process and improvement 
in research quality, and leadership and management cannot be proved…on the other 
hand, there is evidence that the current RAE precipitates behaviours which can be 
damaging to universities and staff (46). 
My report to HEFCE (McNay, 1997) identified views that research management had 
improved, though there was a lesser claim by researchers that research in general, other 
than their own, had improved in quality. Even then, nearly 60 per cent of researchers 
agreed that ‘the research agenda – programmes and priorities – is now defined by people 
other than the researchers themselves’, which runs counter to the Haldane principle, long 
established in UK higher education, that the best people to decide what research to do are 
the researchers, another issue echoing Glaser in this volume. More recently, it is evident 
that Thomas’s final assertion still has relevance (McNay, 2015). 
One damaging behaviour is to let research become ‘what REF says it is’ (Deem, 2016) and 
letting the REF dominate strategic thinking, with ‘gaming’ the next exercise seeming to take 
precedence over longer-term strategic planning of research and support for it in the wider 
context of university/departmental values and stakeholders. That has been clear in some 
recent development work with research leaders in several modern universities.  If, for ‘fame 
and fortune’ as objectives, are substituted ‘reputation and resources’, for many 
departments the key actors in their reputation are not readers of league tables but 
stakeholder-partners in other activities – teaching, student placements, graduate 
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employment. In my own unit, income from RAE/REF did not cover the staff cost of preparing 
the submission. More income derives from work in partnership with clusters/consortia of 
schools and colleges from where research questions are posed by those who need evidence 
to support decision-making to improve policy and practice. This does not rate highly with 
the Education panel in REF. What it does do is build on established contacts, adding value to 
them, and involves staff and sometimes students who are in the research arena for other 
purposes, making a research ‘top-up’ cheaper than starting from the beginning. It also 
makes impact easier and quicker, because those involved in implementation have been 
involved from the beginning in design, development and delivery of the research. The long-
term relationships are a firmer foundation for continued engagement than trying to read 
the chicken entrails and divine what the next exercise might involve. Funding from partners 
is greater, more assured and open to negotiation. Working is collegial in an entrepreneurial 
culture as more contacts/clients/partners are added. That contrasts with the corporate 
bureaucracy approaches of many senior managers and research ‘support’ offices (McNay, 
1995).  
That aligns with a ‘supporter’ strategy identified in an article that appeared as I finalised this 
one (Silander and Haake, 2016: pp7-9), which combines top-down and bottom-up initiatives 
– an ‘interplay between organic growth and strategic vision’, where co-operation with the 
regional business community is important. By contrast, their ‘gold-digger’ label is based on 
‘follow the money’ – a top-down strategy to find the currently fashionable areas – ‘gold-
shimmering’ - and promote them, disregarding current activity profile or linkages. Their 
third label – ‘inclusive’ – comes close to laissez-faire with resources spread thinly. They 
found universities in Sweden that matched all three strategies for developing a research 
profile. 
If managers read the research, the evidence is strong in identifying the optimal 
management culture. In a project funded by the Leadership Foundation for HE, itself funded 
by the sector, so that institutions are the intended users and where impact will be 
measured, Franco-Santos et al (2014) noted that universities ‘are currently becoming more 
short-term and results/output driven due to the increased pressures to perform’ (p7). That 
implies what they label an ‘agency’ approach, with greater monitoring and control, which 
academics find ‘unhelpful and dysfunctional’ but which was preferred by professional staff 
because it gave ‘clarity and focus’. On the other hand, ‘stewardship’ approaches foster long-
term outcomes through people’s knowledge and values, autonomy and shared leadership 
within a high trust environment’ (p7). Such approaches are ‘associated with…higher staff 
wellbeing…higher research excellence results, students’ satisfaction…employability and 
financial results’ (p7). So, economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Those findings are 
supported by many others: Kallio and Kallio (2014) on performance management; Edgar and 
Geare (2013) on high performing departments and collegial culture; Kok and McDonald 
(2015) on leadership and management behaviours to underpin excellence. The list could be 
long. Yet the drift to New Public Management continues. And yet professional researchers 
(and teachers for student learning) have continued to deliver.  
Other models 
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Reference has already been made to where practice differs in other countries. The recent 
review (Stern, 2016) commissioned a study of models close to REF, but that has not yet 
been published. There are those in the Anglo-Saxon tradition and on the European mainland 
which could be examined for lessons. 
Approaches in other countries differ from the UK in several respects. In the Netherlands 
research and teaching are assessed together and panels visit the institutions. Ratings follow 
a similar four point scale, but are not used for funding, nor, officially, for rankings. The 
strategic plan for 2016-2020 from the French higher education and research evaluation 
agency (HCERES) says it will evaluate work in a broader setting, and adopt a strategic 
approach to funding, not the formulaic processes of the UK funding bodies.  In Hong Kong, 
an holistic approach uses all four of the Carnegie scholarships – discovery, integration, 
application, dissemination (Boyer, 1990). In the USA, where there is no national equivalent 
of a REF, applications for federal research funding, to the National Science Foundation and 
the National Institutes for Health, have to show how findings will be used in teaching, and 
will broaden research participation and enhance capacity. Australia and New Zealand look 
forward and see their exercises as developing quality and the capacity of professionals who 
deliver it as well as advancing national strategic agendas and world status (McNay, 2015). 
So, criteria in Excellence in Research in Australia include ‘identifying emergent areas and 
opportunities for further development’ (ARC, 2014). In New Zealand, one objective is ‘to 
increase the average quality of basic and applied research ( Ministry of Education, 2014:7). 
Its achievement can be measured: ‘the number of staff whose evidence portfolios have 
been assigned a funded Quality Category increased by 41.6% between 2003 and 2012’. (TEC, 
2013:6). Middleton (2009), cited in Sato and Endo (2014) points out that ‘the impact of 
research assessment runs deeper than mere measurement of “what is there”; such 
processes are productive or formative’. In the light of the English approach, it is worth 
noting that the 2013 objectives had included to ’prevent the undue concentration of 
funding’. Both antipodean countries make specific reference to support for students and 
newer researchers. So, there are lessons for the UK to learn from others, despite its view 
that is a leader in the field, by virtue of being the pioneer, and setting the model for others 
to follow. 
Envoi: looking forward 
This article has attempted to offer evidence that the policy behind the UK REF, and 
particularly in England given the importance of its funding model, is ill-defined. The ends are 
loosely stated; the means are constantly changing, creating uncertainty that operates 
against innovation. The evidence of value for money is missing; the effect of concentrated 
funding has strong risks attached; competition leads to sub-optimal isomorphism and loss of 
a diversity of excellences. The overall effect, over the years, has been to imbalance HE 
activity at several levels.  A consultation on the future of the exercise was started in 2015 by 
HEFCE, but suspended when the government announced its intention to commission it own 
review, when it was clear what would emerge (McKenzie and Gallardo, 2016). It seems likely 
that responsibility for any future exercise will transfer to a super council for research (Nurse, 
2015), which a senior Treasury civil servant has now been appointed to chair. Teaching and 
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research will be further separated at system level, diversity of funding streams will be 
reduced and the elitist network will be further strengthened. Politicians think that bigger is 
better as a default position, and remain convinced that money can be saved by adopting 
metrics as a dominant means, despite the recent report to the funding councils supporting a 
hybrid approach with peer review retained, with different approaches providing different, 
complementary data  (Wilsdon, 2015). Perhaps ministers think that was the wrong answer. 
That is the problem with doing research on policy analysis: ideology trumps rational 
objectivity. How big an impact factor do you think this article will have before the next 
exercise? 
There are other issues for UK research: the turbulence of the HE system, and the 
consequent stress for staff, has been evident in recent weeks. Government is in turmoil 
following the referendum vote to leave the European Union. That could mean considerable 
loss of income from EU funding for research and other projects, as well as affecting 
international research partnerships and staff recruitment and job security. There is a Higher 
Education and Research Bill before parliament, which may be law by the end of 2016, to 
restructure the governance of higher education, and, despite those fine words quoted 
above on the interdependence of teaching and research, to separate policy, development, 
implementation and funding for the two functions even more. The restructuring of 
government departments by the new prime minister, Theresa May, means that the minister 
for higher education and science, Jo Johnson, brother of the more infamous Boris, now 
heads functions not just in separate units of the one ministry – formerly Business, 
Innovation and Skills, notably not referencing either HE or Science – but to different senior 
politicians in different ministries, since universities have been moved to the Department for 
Education, while research has remained in a remodelled ministry of Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy. There is still no mention of research in that title and the new super 
council for research and innovation is to be chaired by a senior mandarin from the Treasury, 
giving an indication of how government sees the strategic function of research.  
There is some hope on the horizon. The government-commissioned independent review of 
research assessment reported at the end of July (Stern, 2016). It examined the purpose and 
benefits of REF; current problems and issues [many treated in this article]; principles and 
high-level recommendations for shaping future exercise recognises many of the issues 
raised in this article; and a vision of the organisational location of the REF. Its title – Building 
on success and learning from experience – suggests a less than radical intent, but an 
acknowledgement of the approach in the second quadrant of my model above, and 
underlying my critique, some of which it shares. Its membership was dominated by the 
elitist research-heavy universities, with five members, plus one from Princeton, with none 
from the modern universities with their different values and experiences. That is refelected 
in the recommendations, which cover: 
- outputs, where all active staff with outputs, however many should be submitted, 
with an average output per head, but allowing some – the better ones - to submit 
more. Outputs should not be portable, [which shifts the ownership from the 
academic professional to the institution and will constrain staff movement], and 
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should continue to be assessed by peer review supported by metrics, disappointing 
advocates of more quantitative methods 
- impact, which should include an institutional level element to allow treatment of 
interdisciplinary project teams that cross internal divisions. A more flexible approach 
should allow a wider scope of areas of impact, including teaching 
- environment should have a major element focused on the institution – its research 
culture and corporate support for research, with unit submissions framed by that 
institutional assessment 
- system policy should ensure more strategic use of REF results and data, linking to 
other data collecting exercises to avoid duplication and promote integration; to 
better understand the health of the research base , areas for future development 
and the case for strong investment in research. 
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Table 1.  REF 2014 Quality profile: percentages by grade 
 
4*  3*  2*  1*  0 
Overall   30  46  20  3  1 
 
Outputs  22.4  49.5  23.9  3  0.6 
Impact  44  39.9  13  2.4  0.7 
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Figure 1 Ends and means in RQA 
 
 
